February 2, 1947
Alma-Ata
Formalism als Fehlerhaftes.
Vortasten of the true that makes it
such.
Vorahnung of the lawful unity of the order through [different] domains and
[throughout] history. But the error lies in the establishment of their
parallelism and analogy, and not at the level of the reflection of fundamental
lawfulness throughout the different historical phases of the different nations,
across their inimitable and unique, historically specific, interpretations (chtenia).
…
True in the basic
orientation—superficially playful—juggling with analogies—and nothing more in
the equations and comparisons above.
Absolutely
ridiculous—the theory of formal arbitrariness and of groundlessness of form in
the theory of estrangement (ostranenie).
Shklovsky’s Natasha Rostova and what it
really means [English in the original].
Ridiculous:
To liken Walt
Whitman to Pushkin, who in turn resembles Zweig—just because of the similarity
of their artistic devices (a typically formalist basic term of formalism).
Ridiculous: W.W. =
P. = Z.
Even more stupid:
to take as a basis their mutual
influence: P. --> W.W. --> Z.
True:
The condition of
possibility for the similarity: the principle of the structure of pathos as inherent [English in the original] in
and reflecting in itself the structural principle of the movement of matter.
The principle of
the metaphor as the basic means of conquering a phenomenon in the first stages
in the development of humanity.
Similar and
comparable—to the later phases—not on the basis of their sameness, but across
historically diverse applications of the laws, in which (in the structure of
these very laws) such historically conditioned phenomena of reality were
reflected, as subjects and forms.
The fundamental
laws of development are reflected—are reflectively preserved—have been reflected in the structure (in the principles of the
structure).
The higher the
level [razryad] of creation, the more
originally the laws are reflected in it.
The principles of
the set of tropes: metaphor—metonymy—synecdoche reflected the historical phase of the first, pre-conceptual,
imaginary [obraznogo] conquest of the
world with the help of analogies and transfers from one thing to the other.
In the principles
of the composition of pathos, however—in the structure of pathos—one finds a deeper historical stage: the
principles of the movement of matter.
Etc.
“Confusion”
probably lies in the fact that the
conception of form is not clearly, consciously, and methodologically
distinguished. Form as the appearance [vidimost’]
of the object (idiots call it: “the container for content”)—and form as the structure and ordering of things. Instead of the couple content-form we need
three “stages”:
content-form-structure
(skeleton-body-spirit).
Their specific and
functional interrelatedness:
par
exemple, metaphor
Structure—it
reflects the stage in development in which the conquest takes
place by means of transfer;
Form—the
way in which at any given stage, with respect to the given
content, this particular structure is applied; differently in Mayakovsky
than in Homer;
Content—reflection
in the consciousness of the given
historical epoch, determining
the fulfillment through a precise set of elements, and
determining (1) why this particular structure and not another
has been chosen and (2) why in the given epoch this structure
is vested in precisely this or other sensuous effect (form),
par exemple why a victim is not hacked into pieces (the
Gorboduc of the Elizabethans) but
rather has to undergo moral
(self-)torture (par example in
Dostoevsky).
This can be very
well observed in the example of Revenge
Tragedy [English in the original].
Revenge is in its
structure a reflection of the physical principle
of the equality of action and
counter-action.
Already this
physical principle grows out into a principle of primitive morality of the “An
eye for an eye” type and of the similar norms in Roman Law.
It is also
reflected in the art of theater. Both, as a reflection of moral norms, but also
as a principle of construction—of the structure of the permeating theme of the
Avenger as the cornerstone of the early Elizabethan period (see also in
Shakespeare: personal revenge, as well as the revenge of Fate in response to a
disturbance in the order of things, etc.—similarly in the dramas of antiquity).
With social
development and “ideological growth” the aspect of the drama of jealousy changes.
Not yet fully in Richard III (standing with one of its
legs in pre-Shakespearean theatre), but fully in Hamlet (with one of its legs already in post-Shakespearean
theatre).
Or the conflict
between the tit for tat [English in the
original] tradition and the jurisprudence and new norms in the Merchant of Venice.
The structure
undergoes a mutation, takes on the form of new aspects:
Ancient tragedy as
the form of the drama of Fate (man—destiny);
Elizabethan
tragedy as the form of drama between people (man—man);
Drama of the pangs
of consciousness—Raskolnikov, and Chekhov’s “superfluous men,” and going to the
guilt-ridden gentry (man with himself).
In all these
manifestations of form, however, lies a basic structure, reflecting “an eye for
an eye” as the fundamental physical
natural law: “action=counter-action”. Any new manifestation has to be compared to it (the
reflection of a physical law in … the
feeling of “justice” … and for this reason also an innate [English in the original] feeling).
By the way, one
needs to mention that the institute of “trial by jury”—judgment not based on
jurisprudence but on the feeling of
justice—is not the most monumental confirmation, the expression of the
deepest reverence for this innateness—the
natural feeling of justice.
In English
jurisprudence this comes into question not only in decisions regarding guilt and
innocence, but also—in the institution of the “Coroner’s Inquest” [English in the original]—with respect to the
question whether the given catastrophe should be investigated as an unfortunate
occurrence, a suicide, or a crime.
The same applies
to the need for the jury’s verdict to be unanimously accepted: that is, as a
categorical—beyond any doubt—expression of the fundamental feeling of justice.
These mutations of
the single structure (principle) through different
forms of its exposition, differ radically from Aeschylus, to
Marlow—Shakespeare—Webster, to Dostoevsky, as they are determined by the
difference in the ideal content, which grows out of differing ideological
conceptions that in turn reflect the social-historical stages of human
development, out of which they have emerged.
(NB. Very important. [English in the
original])
[From: Sergei Eisenstein, Metod, Vol. 2 (Moscow: Muzei kino, 2002), 387-9.]
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