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May 5, 1944
Alma-Ata
Beattie (18th
century) titled his excellent investigation On
Laughter and Ludicrous Composition.
It is written in a
very English manner—instrumentalized, with a view towards application. Of the type: “How is it done?” Until
now, it has been precisely England that excels
[English in the original] in the production of manuals, such as “how to
draw animals?” “how to draw a human figure?” etc., etc. (see “Studio” editions)
We go further—we, essentially,
pose the problem of the “ludicrous form” [English in the original], i.e. of the
structure, the principles of the phenomenon of the ludicrous. The structure is
not isolated: [we are interested] in the circumstances in which the structure
is actualized (social ordering [zakaz]),
in what are the preconditions and the basis of the structure’s effect
(psychological analysis), and finally, we will think through the meaning of the
facticity of the risible (philosophical analysis).
All three factors
are, however, arranged with respect to the solution of the structural problem
and in their respective domains and qualities, of course, echo the same
principle as does the structure in its activity. Because (of course) it—the
structure—is the material concretization of the figurative meanings woven into
each of the three domains—isolatedly interrelated
[English in the original]; and not only interrelated,
but also mutually conditioned by each other.
To sharpen the
thesis to the limit.
At stake is the
specific aspect of the state of phenomena (the
form of phenomena) when they justifiably provoke laughter (we say “justifiably” with reference to the relative nature of
the actual effect, which depends on the situation, the perceiver, etc.—this is
the subject of a separate chapter).
The comic
tradition itself gave birth to the type of anecdote that confirms my thesis.
About the general
who, telling the anecdote, distorts its structure.
This type of
anecdote is nothing other than bringing to the limit, pushing towards the comic
(also auch in diesem Falle—the comic
as a specific aspect of reworking a statement that is not necessarily funny,
but made funny [English in the
original]!), by sharpening the thesis
“to tell an anecdote in one’s own words,” which refers to the loss of the comic
effect that can only be maintained in a certain ordering—form—of the tale’s
structure. For instance:
Two Jews wanted to
play a word game: “Where are you?—I am in the moss!” One of them says: “I will
hide. You ask. I will answer.” He hides. The other asks: “Kanzellenbogen, where
are you?!”—“I am … in the wood shavings!”
Or: when the
general wanted to tell the joke about a man who had no topsoil [derna] and a woman who had no eggs [yaitsa]; and the woman yells to the man:
“Let me pull your balls!” [Dai dernu za
yaitsa! Literally, let’s exchange topsoil for eggs.] But in the aspect we
are considering:
“The man had no
straw and the peasant woman had no cabbage. They measured each other up. Here
comes the peasant woman and yells to the man: ‘Let me pull your balls!’”
And so ad infinitum.
It is the same
with the rhymed type, where everything hangs on the rhymes, but is told without
them (Lieutenant Bobrov—ditch [rov],
etc.)
It is the same
with the puzzle-solution type.
There exists as
much of a comic sharpening by way of another aspect [of the phenomenon]—the
specific aspect of form—musical, rhythmic, related to
stanzas, poetic, and so on, which once again places the comic form into other
forms—“poetic form”, alliterating form, etc. (notwithstanding the scope [English in the original] and [the
complexity]—the commensurability of the problem’s unreal reach).
All of this does
not address the question of “Humor als Lebensgefühl,” as the
Germans like to put it.
But it does set
the limits and helps to orient us.
The path of
analysis will enter through the door of predisposition
and enter into this particular type of structure, whether by way of the
inclination toward the physical (the domain: Spaßmacher,
passively-risible or actively-comical object of laughter), or the interest in the
behavior of the mind (the domain: the subject of laughter—[iponist] par excellence).
Hence, all the
local possibilities arising from the structure, par example: if one is dealing with a pathetic [patetik]—ein Betrachter that exists in an inextricable communion; if [ipnotist]—ein Betrachter who necessarily and factually destroys the communion and any
deliberate or supposed unity with it (par
example, The Letters of Obscure Men
by Erasmus [sic! Eisenstein makes a mistake here. Erasmus did not write this
work. One of the authors of The Letters…
was Ulrich von Hutten]).
From here all the inevitable
characterological determinations and necessary prerequisites become possible (par example, in the analysis by
Leacock). To make brief Scheinwerfer-Ausfluge to A. France
(using the book The Ironic Temples
Chevalier), Gogol, Twain (using the book The
Ordeal of Mark Twain).
And all types of
nuances flow from here as well. The path is correct—the structure’s formula is
the unity abstracted from countless particular cases. And it is absolutely
correct that any new particular cases and examples can be read across the
structure and recognized in its modulations.
[From: Sergei Eisenstein, Metod, Vol. 2 (Moscow: Muzei kino, 2002), 383-4.]
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